Inexpressibility in Augustine’s Just War Theory: Lessons for Modern Warfare by Beard, Matt
University of Notre Dame Australia
ResearchOnline@ND
Philosophy Conference Papers School of Philosophy
2012
Inexpressibility in Augustine’s Just War Theory: Lessons for Modern Warfare
Matt Beard
University of Notre Dame Australia, matthew.beard@nd.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/phil_conference
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This conference paper was originally published as:
Beard, M. (2012). Inexpressibility in Augustine’s Just War Theory: Lessons for Modern Warfare. Biennial Conference on Philosophy,
Religion and Culture: The Expressible and the Inexpressible.
This conference paper is posted on ResearchOnline@ND at
http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/phil_conference/25. For more
information, please contact researchonline@nd.edu.au.
Inexpressibility in Augustine’s Just War Theory: Lessons for Modern Warfare 
Abstract 
 
St. Augustine's Just War Theory is relatively unique in the history of just war in that he relies heavily 
on Divine involvement in his doctrine of just war. God is the ultimate source of the justice of all wars, 
and his command is the source of justice for some wars. Furthermore, the authority of political 
leaders is also derived from God. This is problematic for Augustine's theory because it renders the 
causa justa of wars inexpressible to the subjects of the sovereign, who are forced to rely on the 
sovereign's (divinely originated) authority. Although these ideas may seem a long way from the 
state-of-affairs in war today, I will suggest that notions like the privilege of state secrecy, the implied 
expertise of political leaders, and the coercive power of patriotism represent new manifestations of 
the inexpressibility of the Divine in the modern-day practice of warfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
At first sight there seems to be very little to say about the expressible and the inexpressible in just 
war theory (JWT): seemingly, JWT falls entirely in the domain of the ‘expressible’; everything that we 
might want to say or need to say about the ethics of war can be – or has been – said. However, 
although in some respects this conference’s role should be to identify, acknowledge and perhaps 
celebrate the role of inexpressibility, I believe there is also room to critically examine those areas in 
which inexpressibility is entirely undesirable. One such area is JWT; where any theory worth its salt 
must be able to express what can and cannot be done with regard to war, and where actual 
decisions need to be explained and justified in terms of theoretical requirements. That Augustine’s 
JWT is an unacceptable one for practice will be demonstrated through discussion of his reliance on 
direct involvement of the divine in the vital jus ad bellum criteria just cause and legitimate authority.  
However, although modern warfare (at least in Anglophone and European states) has distanced 
itself from discussion of the divine, I want to suggest a few ways in which we have failed to avoid 
some of the shortcomings – and I will focus here on shortcomings related to inexpressibility – that 
accompanied Augustine’s focus on the Divine.  
Augustine’s Just War Theory 
Augustine's overall project with regard to war and peace
1
 can be understood as answering the 
question of how the Christian pacifism of the early centuries AD, based on the Christ's teaching in 
the Gospel of Matthew
2
 was mistaken. "[W]hat is here required [in turning the other cheek] is not a 
bodily action, but an inward disposition. The sacred seat of virtue is the heart"
3
 Augustine sought to 
show the relationship between – and compatibility of – Christian faith and war; particularly the 
relationship(s) between war and God's justice. The primary issue to which Augustine was to respond 
was the pacifist view that all killing is forbidden. Augustine’s first contribution was to distinguish 
between killing and murder. Murder - unjust intentional killing - is, of course, expressly forbidden, 
but Augustine does note that "not all homicide is murder".
4
 Exceptions come when killing is 
commanded by those with authority to do so, viz. public individuals on those who deserve the 
punishment;
5
 however, the intentional killing of one individual by another is always forbidden. This 
includes, for Augustine, self-defence.
6
 The only time killing might be permissible is when it is done by 
an authority with power to do so, power which, as we shall see, ultimately comes from God. 
                                                          
1
 I will not be dealing with Augustine's writings chronologically, but as a body of work in which each work 
represents different aspects of a complete theory. Thus unless Augustine explicitly rejects a view presented in 
another work, I will assume that each represent part of the same system. 
2
 Matthew 5: 39 (NIV), "But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, 
turn to him the other also."  
3
 Augustine, Contra Faustum [CF], 22.76, Accessed: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/140622.htm 
[26/4/2012] 
4
 Augustine trans. Henry Bettenson, City of God [CG], Penguin Books, Victoria, 2003, 1.21 
5
 See CG, 1.21, "the commandment forbidding killing was not broken by those [...] who have imposed the 
death penalty on criminals when representing the authority of the State in accordance with the laws of the 
state." 
6
 See: Holmes, WM, p.120. "To kill another person in defense of this earthly life represents an inordinate desire 
to cling to those things one ought not to love." 
The permission for authorised killing derives from the distinction between human and divine law 
echoed in Augustine’s famous distinction between the City of God and the City of Man. There are 
laws from the eternal (God) which are beyond the laws of man (meaning they are not written by 
man), and the laws of man must be subject to the eternal law, as Augustine famously notes "an 
unjust law is no law at all".
7
 Human law should (but does not always, due to original sin
8
) adhere to 
eternal law, which is to be obeyed because the ultimate happiness of humanity lies in salvation in 
heaven through God, the ultimate source of justice.
9
 This note is important because - as we will see - 
for Augustine, war can be permitted either by (a) eternal law, or (b) human law, with very different 
moral implications for each. 
The invocation of the language of eternal law is problematic, however, when we turn to war in 
Augustine, because although the term eternal law is interchangeable with natural law,
10
 which is 
knowable through reason, Augustine’s writings on war seem to indicate that God plays a more direct 
role in granting authority to go to war, indeed going so far as to directly command particular wars; 
which leads to the first manifestation of inexpressibility in Augustine: inexpressibility of cause. 
That wars commanded by God are just is clear for Augustine: those wars are just simply by God's 
having declared them as such. ”God's commands are to be submissively received, not to be argued 
against."
11
 Augustine here presents a something like a divine command ethic whereby obedience to 
God, as the source of justice, must always be just. However, it should be noted that Augustine is not 
a divine command theorist - understood as one who holds that whatever God commands (and he 
may command anything) is what is just to do - in that he believed that God's nature was 
"incorruptible, inviolable and immutable",
12
 meaning that God and goodness are for Augustine one 
and the same - as God's nature cannot change, neither can the good. 
[T]he account of the wars of Moses will not excite surprise or abhorrence, for in wars carried on 
by divine command, he showed not ferocity but obedience; and God in giving the 
command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and 
warning those who needed warning.
13
 
Here arises the first problem of inexpressibility: if a particular war’s justice is knowable only through 
God’s command,
14
 how is that justice to be communicated to anyone other than the leader himself? 
To cite the number of unjust wars that have been fought in the name of God would be a redundant 
exercise, but Augustine seems to maintain the claim whilst ignoring the important point of the 
sovereign’s need to justify his cause for war. It is one thing to accept God’s command as a just cause, 
                                                          
7
 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, 1.5.11, in Holmes, WM, p. 123 
8
 See: CG, 19.15 
9
 CG, 19.25 
10
 Richard J. Dougherty, ‘Natural Law’, in Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Michigan, 1999, pp. 582-584 esp. P. 583 
11
 Augustine, CF, 22.71. This view is later endorsed by Aquinas in ST I-II, Q. 94, Art. 5, resp. 2. 
12
 Augustine trans. John K. Ryan, Confessions, Image Books, Sydney, 1960, 7.1 
13
CF, 22.74 
14
 Or, in the less likely case of Divine Command Theory, the war is just simply because God commanded it. 
it is another to demonstrate any evidence that such a command has actually occurred.
15
 Just cause, 
at least this particular type of just cause, appears completely inexpressible.  
For Augustine, this isn’t an issue because the sovereign’s authority also comes from the divine, and 
there therefore seems to be little reason to question it. Although Augustine views the state as made 
up of sinful men – one thinks of the famous “band of robbers” assertion – he does believe it to be 
legitimised by God’s authority. God acts providentially through the behaviour of fallen states, and 
they are thus “agent[s] of God's design for the world in punishing man for his sins.”
16
 Robert L. 
Holmes explains how state’s role in God’s providential plan gives them legitimate authority. 
The ruler, then, whether he be good or bad, plays a role in the carrying out of God's will on earth. 
In this sense he rules by divine ordination. As he thus has legitimate authority, and as the state is 
an institution of God's agency in the world, individual citizens of the state owe nearly absolute 
allegiance to the ruler.
17
 
The near-absolute obedience is why Augustine wasn’t concerned with whether a sovereign could 
justify the cause of a war to his citizens. Augustine - as Holmes showed above - believed the state to 
be "the justest and most reasonable source of power"
18
, the killings the state orders are, by 
extension, ordered by God.
19
 Original sin of course means that sometimes laws which should be just 
are not, meaning that any killings that these laws command are evil. However, the executors 
themselves (including soldiers) are not to blame, for "one who owes a duty of obedience to the giver 
of the command does not himself 'kill' - he is an instrument, a sword in its user's hand."
20
 Langan 
summarises the soldier's moral immunity well: "Authorization to take part in hostilities, even when 
this comes from "an un-godly king" or involves an "unrighteous command" leaves the soldier 
innocent "because his position makes obedience a duty"."
21
  
However, state authority being derivative of God’s providence is incredibly problematic for the JW 
theorist, because even the actions of blatantly unjust states may be part of God’s plan; indeed, 
Augustine is comfortable with attributing Rome’s bloody wars of Empire to God’s providence. "[W]e 
must ascribe to the true God alone the power to grant kingdoms and empires [...] God himself gave 
dominion to the Romans without the worship of those gods to whose worship the Romans thought 
they owned the empire."
22
 This is doubly-curious as Augustine argues that the desire for dominion is 
inconsistent with virtue,
23
 thus is seems that God is willing to grant victory to the wicked on some 
occasions. The leaders of Rome had acted from their own volition, with no awareness of, or interest 
                                                          
15
 I am here reminded of the debate that surrounded Alvin Plantinga’s controversial “reformed epistemology”, 
if belief in God is properly basic, then it seems impossible to convince those who have not had an experience. 
16
 Holmes, WM, p. 130. Italics added. 
17
 Holmes, WM, p. 130. Holmes continues by explaining when the citizen is exempt from obeying the ruler, and 
the answer is a return to Augustine's divine command ethic. "Only if he [the ruler] should directly command 
them to do something contrary to God's will may they disobey him." 
18
 Augustine, CG, 1.21 
19
 Ibid., "There are some whose killing God orders, either by a law, or by an express command". 
20
 Ibid. Augustine even goes so far as to defend the judge and torturer who condemn an innocent man to 
torture in order to gain a confession. See: CG, 19.6 
21
 Langan, AJWT, p. 23. Of course, it should be recognised that soldiers fighting in a JW are equally 
instrumental and thus free from any moral concerns as well (assuming their internal dispositions are just 
ones). 
22
 CG, 5.21 
23
 CG, 4.15 
in, divine mandate, however they could easily have claimed such, and their people would have been 
given little reason to question it. The blind acceptance of state legitimacy and the permissiveness 
with which Augustine seems to treat blatantly unjust wars – justifying them as providential – is a 
direct consequence of his faith in Divine involvement in the world.  
Modern Warfare: Augustine’s Legacy 
There seems to be little to say about Augustine's inexpressibility in relation to the modern day; we 
may not doubt his legacy as one of the founders of JWT, but question his continuing relevance in his 
regard. Even amongst theological JWTs, Augustine ranks comparably low by comparison to those of 
Aquinas and Paul Ramsay, for instance. However, although the divine origin of the inexpressibility of 
just cause, and further of the divinity of authority has dwindled, the products have remained - 
although they have obviously changed over time, managing to ingrain themselves into a less 
religious community. There are two ways I want to suggest that these forms of divinity and 
inexpressibility have taken hold in the modern day: the invocation of national security as a 
justification for withholding evidence (state secrecy), the crisis-based rhetoric of patriotism.  
A: State secrecy 
National defence as a justification for state secrecy (and state secrecy more generally) presents the 
opportunity for a modern-day equivalent to the divine command to declare war. Returning to 
Augustine's example, imagine the war of Moses, if the people had dared ask Moses to somehow 
prove that God had spoken to him and commanded him to war. Moses could perhaps point to 
previous miracles as evidence that God may well be interceding through him again, but this would 
be circumstantial. If the follower(s) were not convinced that this war was divinely mandated, Moses 
would have little evidence to rely on; he would rather rely on his authority, and the threat of a 
displeased God.  
Fast-forward to the modern day and imagine a government, A, who discover that an unstable, 
'rogue' nation, B, has succeeded in weaponising the smallpox virus and intend to deploy the weapon. 
A has the power and means to go to war and potentially prevent this from happening, but requires 
the support of its people, who (naturally) would like some proof of this. However, the dissemination 
of evidence would jeopardize the safety of intelligence officers still in the field, potentially reveal to 
the enemy means of successfully hiding the weapon, or demonstrate A's vulnerability to the 
weapon. In such a case, A would, like Moses, be relying on the faith of its citizens, in going to war 
without demonstrating the justice of the cause. 
Note that the above two cases are ones in which the nations do actually have just cause. The more 
frightening scenario would be where the employment of state secrecy resulted in war being 
declared absent just cause (as some claim occurred in the 2003 Iraq invasion). The inexpressibility 
here is not so much a case of a lack of evidence, but that it is prudential not to provide the necessary 
evidence of one's own justice. This is increasingly difficult where global media and the immediacy of 
social networks mean that keeping public information away from the enemy is impossible. 
B: Patriotism and Crisis 
I suggested there were two ways in which the problems in Augustine I outlined above have been 
carried through to the modern day. The first, state secrecy, is concerned with the inexpressibility of 
just cause. The next is concerned with the legitimacy of authority, and one's ability to express 
uncertainty about the decisions of that authority, for instance to express suspicion about the justice 
of a particular cause.  
Consider the rhetoric that surrounded debate before the US-led invasion of Iraq. Although JW 
theorists now widely condemn the Iraq invasion as an unjust war,
24
 however, as Jane Cramer notes,  
It is widely recognized thatthe U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over 
going to war in Iraq [...]The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and 
ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic.
25
 
Here, the Bush administration mobilized (and was likely itself mobilized by) post-9/11 fear; the 
threat to the US posed by the alleged WMDs of the Hussein regime, and suggested links to Al Qaeda 
were grounds for war, and were popularly accepted as such. However, as Cramer notes, the potency 
of the rhetoric coming from the Bush administration earned it a status as 'unchallengeable'. 
For Augustine, citizens owed almost complete obedience to the state because the state, as an agent 
of God's will in the world, also possessed his authority. To question or ignore the sovereign was to 
defy the will of God. The crisis faced by the US and the subsequent invasion of Iraq were not divinely 
commanded, but they enjoyed a special status because of the crisis situation that Americans 
perceived themselves to be in, as Cramer again notes:  
individual political actors, especially prominent politicians of national stature, were constrained in 
their individual behavior by cultural norms of behavior. It was imperative for them to avoid being 
labeled unpatriotic, thus they could not espouse policies that could be construed as weak on 
national security or as unsupportive of the executive branch in a time of crisis.
26
 
This has been labelled by some commentators as "the FOX effect",
27
 "which contends that the 
mainstream media was under pressure to be more patriotic in its coverage because of competitive 
pressures from the meteoric rise of the jingoistic FOX news in this period."
28
 Ronald Krabs and 
Jennifer Lobasz have also suggested that the Democrat party was less vocal in opposition that one 
might expect "because they had been “rhetorically coerced,” unable to advance a politically 
sustainable set of arguments with which to oppose the war."
29
  
                                                          
24
 See, for examples: Stephen Strelhe, 'Saddam Hussein, Islam and Just War Theory', Political Theology, Vol. 5, 
Iss. 1, 2004, pp. 76-101; William A. Galston, 'The Perils of Preemptive War', Philosophy and Public Policy 
Quarterly, Vol. 22, Iss. 4, 2002, Accessed: http://www.cas.umt.edu/phil/documents/GALSTON.pdf [30/7/12]; 
Michael Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
14, 2003, pp. 227-240; Brian Orend, The Morality of War, Broadview, Ontario, 2006, pp. 78-83 
25
 Jean Kellet Cramer, 'Militarized Patriotism: Why the US Marketplace of Ideas Failed Before the Iraq War', 
Security Studies, Vol. 13, Iss. 3, 2007, pp. 489-524 at p. 489 
26
 ibid., p. 492 
27
 See: Adel Iskandar, ''The Great American Bubble’: FOX News Channel, the ‘Mirage’ of Objectivity, and the 
Isolation of American Public Opinion', in Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamalipour, (eds.), Bring ‘Em On: Media and 
Politics in the Iraq War, Rowman & Littleﬁeld, Maryland, 2005, pp. 155–74 
28
 Cramer, op. cit., p. 494 
29
 Ronald R. Krebs & Jennifer K. Lobasz, 'Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War 
in Iraq', Security Studies, Vol. 16, Iss. 3, 2007, pp. 409-451 at p. 409 
My point in noting the 2003 Iraq is that whilst for Augustine to question the will of the sovereign was 
to question the will of God, and therefore heretical, to question actions done in the interests of 
national security in a time of crisis is to commit the modern-day sacrilege of failing to be patriotic. 
For groups reliant on public approval (such as the media and politicians), this has the effect of stifling 
important dissent. Indeed, it was Francisco di Vitoria who noted importantly that "for the just war it 
is necessary to examine the justice and causes of war with great care, and also to listen to the 
arguments of the opponents, if they are prepared to negotiate genuinely and fairly."
30
  
Conclusion 
I have argued that St. Augustine encounters problems of inexpressibility as a product of the 
possibility of direct divine intervention in war. These are problems because war is something which 
should be subject to public scrutiny; just as a judge will want to know why an alleged murderer 
should be excused from the charged, the declaration of war cannot be granted license to hide 
behind the shades of secrecy. However, despite the jettisoning of Augustine's reliance on the divine, 
the modern day practice of war has not entirely shirked the problems of inexpressibility introduced 
by Augustine. The employment of state secrecy and the patriotic rhetoric that occurs in crisis 
moments are both methods of bypassing the scrutiny which JWT seeks to apply to the declaration of 
war. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of what I am able to discuss here to outline how these 
problems might be rectified, but it goes without saying that being aware of the problem is a helpful 
step in reaching a solution.  
                                                          
30 Francisco di Vitoria, On the Law of War, Q. 2, Art. 1, Sec. 21, in Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence (eds.), 
Vitoria: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991 at p. 307. Italics removed. 
